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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The District Court and this Court have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Section 78A-5-102 (formerly codified as 78-3-4). This Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4-103 (formerly
codified as 78-2a-3j). This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the District
Court on November 5, 2007. {See Order, R. at 6020-6025.)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction as a

matter of law.
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.,
2007 UT App 407 If 34,175 P.3d 572 (holding that the appellate court review the trial
court's ruling on summary judgment and the trial court's interpretation of a contract
for correctness).
Preservation for appeal: Bank One raised the issue in the trial court (R. at 3436; R. at 3031-34), and Bodell noted opposition (R. at 49-63; R. at 4038-4533).
2.

Whether the Settlement Agreement discharges the claims against Bank

One and Robbins.
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.,
2007 UT App 407 If 34,175 P.3d at 579 (holding that the appellate court review the
trial court's ruling on summary judgment and the trial court's interpretation of a
contract for correctness).

1
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Preservation for appeal: Bank One raised the issue in the trial court (R. at 3436; R. at 3031-34), and Bodell noted opposition (R. at 49-63; R. at 4038-4533).
3.

Whether the trial court correctly excluded, in part, the expert testimony

of Merrill Weight.
Standard of review: abuse of discretion. Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237
% 12, 74 P.3d 621, 635 (holding that a trial court's decisions regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
Preservation for appeal: Robbins raised the issue in the trial court (R. at 28652873), and Bodell noted opposition (R. at 3390-3403).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following authorities may be determinative of issues raised by this appeal:
Utah Code Section 15-1-1; Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Rule 37
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: NATURE,
PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION
1.

Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") filed this action on July 31,

2003, against Mark H. Robbins ("Robbins"); Cherokee & Walker Investment
Company, L.L.C. ("CWIC"); Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C. ("Cherokee"); Bank One,
Utah ("Bank One"); and DOES 1 through 50. (Compl., R. at 1-20.)
2.

Bodell's Complaint included the following claims: (1) common law

fraud against Robbins and the Doe defendants; (2) civil conspiracy against Robbins
and the Doe defendants; (3) negligent misrepresentation against Bank One; (4) unjust
2
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enrichment against Robbins, CWIC, Cherokee, and the Doe defendants. (See Compl.,
R. at 1-20.)
3.

On October 29, 2003, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment,

moving the trial court to dismiss the claims against Bank One with prejudice based on
the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. (Mot. S.J., R. at 34-36. See also
Mem. Supp. Mot. S.J., R. at 37-48.)
4.

CWIC, Cherokee, and Robbins joined in the motion for summary

judgment. (R. at 90-92, 309-10.)
5.

On March 15,2004, the trial court issued an order denying the motion

for summary judgment. (R. at 316-320.)
6.

On June 6, 2006, the Court dismissed Bodell's claims against CWIC

and Cherokee, pursuant to a joint motion for voluntary dismissal. (R. at 1596-1598,
1874-1943.)
7.

On September 19,2006, Bodell filed its First Amended Complaint,

maintaining its original claims against the defendants and asserting an additional
claim of common law fraud against Bank One. (R. at 2219-2242.)
8.

On June 29, 2007, Robbins moved to exclude the expert testimony of

Bodell's damages expert, Merrill Weight ("Weight"). (Mot., R. at 2865-2873; Mem.
Supp., R. at 2874-3030.)
9.

Bank One joined in the motion to exclude the expert testimony of

Merrill Weight. (R. at 3365-3372.)

3
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10.

On August 22, 2007, the trial court issued an order granting the motion

to exclude the expert testimony of Merrill Weight. (R. at 4766-69.)
11.

On July 2,2007, Bank One filed another motion for summary judgment,

moving the trial court to dismiss the claims against Bank One based, in part, on the
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. (Mot. S. J., R. at 3031-34. See also
Mem. Supp. Mot. S.J., R. at 3035-3222.)
12.

Robbins again joined in the motion for summary judgment. (R. at 3223-

13.

On September 10, 2007, the trial court requested supplemental briefing

3361.)

from the parties regarding whether it could reconsider the order of March 15, 2004
denying the motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of accord and
satisfaction. (Hrg., R. at 6256, pp. 61:17-63:12.)
14.

On October 3,2007, in an oral ruling, the trial court reversed its earlier

order and granted summary judgment on the affirmative defense of accord and
satisfaction. (Hrg. pp. 27:13-28:17, R. at 6255.)
15.

On November 5, 2007, the trial court entered a written order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendants. (R. at 6020-25.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On or about August 30, 2000, MSF Properties, L.C. ("MSF"), executed

a promissory note in the amount of Four Million Dollars in favor of Bodell (the
"Promissory Note"). (R. at 2238-39.)

4
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2.

Marc S. Jenson ("Jenson") personally guaranteed MSF's obligations

under the Promissory Note and executed a guaranty, on or about August 30,2000, in
favor of Bodell (the "Guaranty"). (R. at 2240-42.)
3.

The Promissory Note and Guaranty provided consideration for a loan

from Bodell to MSF in the amount of Four Million Dollars (the "Loan"). (R. at
2240.)
4.

Jenson asserted that he made a number of partial payments on the

Promissory Note totaling just under Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars. (Jenson Dep.
at 334:7-338:8, R. at 3333-34.)
5.

In addition, Jenson claims to have made in-kind payments to Bodell,

including a Rolex watch, a pistol, and an in-store credit at a high-end clothing
boutique. (Jenson Dep. at 340:2-345:19, R. at 5244-5249.)
6.

However, Bodell maintains that Jenson only made one payment, on

May 2,2001, in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars. (PI. Mem. Opp.
at xix T| 38, R. at 0456; Weight Dep. at 103:14-104:6, R. at 4481-82; Expert Report at
5, R. at 4512. See also Jenson Dep. at 337:9-22, R. at 3334.)
7.

On or about March 18, 2003, Bodell entered into an agreement with

MSF and Jenson in order to "achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans" (the
"Settlement Agreement"). (R. at 3336.)
8.

The Settlement Agreement included the following recitations:

5
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WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain loans to MSF
(the "Loans"); and
WHEREAS, Jenson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF under
the Loans; and
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against the amounts
outstanding under the Loans, but is currently in default under the Loans;
and
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all
obligations disputes and other maters outstanding between them, including,
but not limited to the Loans;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and
the covenants and obligations set forth below, and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, the parties hereby agree [to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement].
(R. at 3336.)
9.

The Settlement Agreement included the following provision:

Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement,
MSF has caused $3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be
delivered to [Bodell]. [Bodell] hereby acknowledges receipt of such
funds.
(Settlement Agreement f 1, R. at 3336.)
10.

The Settlement Agreement also included the following provisions:

Each of [Michael Bodell and Bodell], for himself, itself, their affiliates
and for all persons or entities claiming by, through or under him, it or
them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges MSF,
its affiliates and their respective members, managers, officers,
employees and agents (each, including without limitation Jenson, an
"MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, charges,
demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of
action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind and nature,
expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each a "Claim"),
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions among [Michael
6
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Bodell], [Bodell] and any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the
Loans and all related arrangements and transaction, (b) without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges and agrees that the
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including
all principal and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued
thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full; provided
that such releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set
forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution
and delivery thereof.
Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all
persons or entities claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby
(a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges [Bodell], its
affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents
(each, including without limitation [Michael Bodell], a "Bodell Party"),
from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and
transactions among [Michael Bodell], [Bodell] and any MSF Party,
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related arrangements and
transactions; provided that such releases shall not apply to any
obligation of [Bodell] or [Michael Bodell] set forth in this Agreement to
be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof.
(Settlement Agreement ^ 2-3, R. at 3336.)
11.

The Settlement Agreement included the following provision:

Each of the parties hereto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the
provisions hereof, it shall keep confidential the execution, terms and
existence of this Agreement.
(Settlement Agreement f 4, R. at 3336.)
12.

In addition, the Settlement Agreement included the following provision:

This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement
between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and
supersedes all prior negotiations, representations, understandings,
agreements or arrangements between them, whether written or oral, with
respect to the subject matter hereof.
(Settlement Agreement 1f 8, R. at 3337.)

7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that the Settlement Agreement was an accord
and satisfaction that fully resolved all disputes related to the Loan, Promissory Note,
and Guaranty. The Settlement Agreement contained all the necessary elements of an
accord and satisfaction. Whether the Settlement Agreement is viewed as discharging
liquidated or unliquidated claims, there was sufficient consideration to establish an
accord and satisfaction. Further, by its express terms, the Settlement Agreement fully
satisfied the entire dispute as required in an accord and satisfaction.
As an accord and satisfaction, the Settlement Agreement necessarily
discharged all persons who may have had liability arising from the dispute, including
Robbins. Because the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction that
discharged the entire dispute, it is not contrary to the Utah Liability Reform Act
which governs releases of parties. In addition, the fact that the debt owed to Bodell
was fully satisfied, as evidenced by the express terms of the Settlement Agreement,
eliminates the factual basis for any further claims for damages against Robbins.
Finally, the trial court correctly limited the testimony of Bodell's damage
expert to only include the damage theory that Bodell timely disclosed. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bodell did not show good cause for
failing to disclose the expert testimony in compliance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
allowing Bodell to put on testimony of the untimely damage theories would not be
harmless, but would prejudice the defendants. For these reasons, as discussed more
8
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fully below, Robbins respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court rulings
that are the subject of this appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DISCHARGES
BODELL'S CLAIMS AGAINST ROBBINS

An accord and satisfaction releases all claims arising from the obligations of
the original agreement. Brimley v. Gasser, 754 P.2d 97, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
"An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree that a different
performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon,
will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement. The substituted
agreement calling for the different performance discharges the obligation created
under the original agreement." Id. (internal citation omitted).
A.

The Settlement Agreement Is an Accord and
Satisfaction

The Settlement Agreement satisfies all of the requirements of an accord and
satisfaction. The elements of contract formation must be present in an accord and
satisfaction, "including offer and acceptance, competent parties, and consideration."
Brimley v. Gasser, 754 P.2d at 98 (Utah App. 1988) (internal citation omitted).1 In
the context of an accord and satisfaction, consideration must be made in one of two
forms. Consideration may take the form of substituted performance in lieu of the
performance upon which the parties originally agreed. Id. Estate Landscape and

1 In this appeal, Bodell has not raised any dispute as to offer, acceptance, or
competency.
9
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Snow Removal Specialists Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Telco., 844 P.2d 322, 326
(Utah 1992) (holding that an accord and satisfaction can be based on separate
consideration where there is no bona fide dispute or unliquidated claim) {citing
Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980)). Alternatively, the
consideration may take the form of a resolution of a bona fide dispute over an
unliquidated claim. Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UT App 69 ^ 25 n. 6,
180 P.3d 765 (citing S & GInc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 73839 (Utah 1996)). An additional element is payment made in full settlement of the
entire dispute. Id. Finally, an accord and satisfaction requires acceptance of the
payment. Id. If these elements are met, then an agreement is given the effect of an
accord and satisfaction.
1.

The Settlement Agreement was supported by sufficient
consideration to establish an accord and satisfaction because it
resolved a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated claim.

In this case, the Settlement Agreement resolved a dispute over an unliquidated
claim. While Bodell has taken the position that its claims against Jenson were easily
calculable because they were based exclusively on the Promissory Note and Guaranty,
the record evidence compels a different conclusion.
•

First, the Settlement Agreement expressly states that it resolves both
liquidated and unliquidated claims.2 (R. at 3336.) It would be

2 Bodell advances the illogical position that a combination of liquidated and
unliquidated claims cannot satisfy the requirements of an accord and satisfaction.
(Appellant's Brief at 15.) However, where any part of a claim or dispute is
unliquidated, the dispute cannot be liquidated. Such is the situation here.
10
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inappropriate to simply read this language out of the agreement
bargained for by the parties.
•

Second, Jenson disputed whether Bodell had correctly applied all partial
payments and payments in kind against the amount owing on the Note.
See Oliphant v. Estate ofBrunetti, 2002 UT App 375 H 18, 64 P.3d 587,
592 (holding that a dispute over an unliquidated amount existed where,
even though creditor obtained a default judgment against debtor, the
judgment did not accurately reflect payments made against the amount
due). Jenson claimed that, prior to the Settlement Agreement, he made
payments of nearly Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars to Bodell. (Jenson
Dep. at 334:7-338:8, R. at 3333-34.) In addition, Jenson made several
in-kind payments to Bodell, including a Rolex watch, a pistol, and an
in-store credit at a high-end clothing boutique. (R. at 5244-5249.)
Bodell's records showed partial payments of a lesser amount. (See id.)
Moreover, Bodell maintains in this action that Jenson had not paid the
amount that he claimed. (PL Mem. Opp. S.J. at xix % 38, R. at 0456;
Weight Dep. at 103:14-104:6, R. at 4481-82; Expert Report at 5, R. at
4512.)

• Third, Bodell's potential claims against Jenson, as identified in the
Settlement Agreement, specifically included, among other things, fraud.
(R. at 3336.) Certainly, afraudclaim cannot be liquidated where it is
subject to multiple bona fide defenses such as denial of fault, the fault of
11
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the claimant and others, and punitive damages. The allegations
contained in the First Amended Complaint in this case, contain more
than a sufficient basis to state a fraud claim against Jenson. Robbins'
allocation of fault filed in this case underscores that point. (R. at 28532856.)
2.

The Settlement Agreement had sufficient consideration separate
and independent of the resolution of the unliquidated claims to
establish an accord and satisfaction.

In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court held that, where "the underlying claim is liquidated and certain as to
amount, separate consideration must be found to support the accord; otherwise, the
obligor binds himself to do nothing he was not already obligated to do, and the
obligee's promise to accept a substitute performance is unenforceable." Id. at 1372.
Here, the Settlement Agreement expressly provides that it is supported by adequate
consideration. (R. at 3336.) Moreover, the Settlement Agreement shows
consideration separate from the unliquidated claims that, standing alone, is sufficient
to establish an accord and satisfaction. {See R. at 3336-37.)
Under Utah law, the adequacy of consideration is not measured merely in
terms of money value equivalents. Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm 'n, 553
P.2d 413,415-16 (Utah 1976). Rather, "[i]f one party asks for and receives
something which he would not otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is
adequate consideration. Id. (holding that one party's decision to forgo its right to a
hearing and comply with the other party's request was adequate consideration).
12
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The Settlement Agreement includes consideration from MSF and Jenson in the
numerous forms, each sufficient to satisfy the requirement of consideration. The
Settlement Agreement states that it is made "in consideration of the premises set forth
above and the covenants and obligations set forth [therein], and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged." (R. at 3336.) The Settlement Agreement contains covenants and
obligations in addition to the payment of money. For example, the parties agreed to a
confidentiality provision that required each party keep the terms and existence of the
agreement confidential. (R. at 3336.) The parties agreed to a mutual release. (R. at
3337.) The parties agreed to cooperate in facilitating the purposes of the Agreement.
(R. at 3337.) The parties made numerous representations and warranties. (See R. at
3336-37.) The parties agreed to the substitution for prior agreement, and
acknowledge a full satisfaction of the claims. (R. at 3337.) Because these forms of
consideration are present, there is adequate consideration to support an accord, even
if, arguendo, the underlying claim could be liquidated.
3.

The Settlement Agreement fully satisfied the entire dispute as
required to establish an accord and satisfaction.

The Settlement Agreement also meets the next element of an accord and
satisfaction through payment made in full settlement of an entire dispute. The express
terms of the Settlement Agreement provided, among other things, that MSF deliver
Three Million Dollars in immediately available funds to Bodell, and that the parties
discharge their claims arising out of the loan transaction. (R. at 336-37.) In the
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Settlement Agreement, Bodell specifically "acknowledges and agrees that the
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed
fully satisfied and repaid in full." (R. at 3336, emphasis added.) Further, the
Settlement Agreement "sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all proper
negotiations, representations, understandings, agreements or arrangements between
them, whether written or oral, with respect to the subject matter hereof." (R. at 3337.)
Moreover, Bodell admittedly accepted payment in full satisfaction of the entire
dispute. (R. at 3336.) Because each of the requirements is present here, the
Settlement Agreement should be given the effect of an accord and satisfaction.
B.

Because the Settlement Agreement Is an Accord and
Satisfaction, It Discharges All Claims Arising from the
Promissory Note and Guaranty.

The effect of an accord and satisfaction is to fully resolve all claims arising
from the subject matter of the dispute. An accord and satisfaction has rights and can
be distinguished from a release, as follows: "an accord and satisfaction is a
contractual method of discharging a debt or claim by some performance other than
that which was originally due; a release is a contract whereby a party abandons a
claim or relinquishes a right that could be asserted against another." Doyle's Const &
Remodeling, Inc. v. Wendy's Intern., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 969, 976 (N. D. 111. 2001).
See also Thompson v. Nicholson, Docket No. 30A01-9307-CH-00261, 1994 WL
44428 *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) ("While a release has been said to be of the nature of
14
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an accord and satisfaction, and the two are both methods of settling or putting an end
to a claim or obligation, they differ from one another in that a release is a
relinquishment by the creditor or holder of a right, and an accord and satisfaction is a
discharge of a claim or demand by or for the debtor or person liable, by some means
other than its full performance.. ..They differ also in that an executed accord, or
accord in satisfaction, involves the acceptance of something as satisfaction, while a
release is an acknowledgement of satisfaction.")
Where the parties reach an accord and satisfaction in addition to executing a
release, the parties can rely on the accord and satisfaction alone as a bar to claims
arising from the underlying dispute. Koules v. Euro-American Arbitrage, Inc., 689
N.E.2d 411, 417 (111. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that "the accord and satisfaction alone
or the release alone would have operated to bar plaintiffs suit against defendant with
respect to his guaranteed salary claim").
The scope of the Settlement Agreement extends to all disputes between Bodell
and MSF and Jenson, known and unknown, specifically including the Promissory
Note and Guaranty. (R. at 3336.) It establishes without any uncertainty that those
instruments are "deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full." (R. at 3336.) Satisfaction
of the amounts due under the Promissory Note and Guaranty is all that Bodell seeks
by this action. Bodell's claimed damages are no more than "the funds advanced,
together with interest at the legal rate, less payment received from MSF." {See R. at
2895.) Because the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction, it fully
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resolves all claims arising from the Promissory Note and Guaranty as to Jenson and
all others, including Robbins.
C.

The Discharge Provided by the Accord and
Satisfaction Is Not Limited to the Parties to the
Settlement Agreement.

The discharge is not limited to parties to the Settlement Agreement. As
discussed above, where the requirements of an accord and satisfaction are met, the
agreement fully resolves a dispute) the effects of the accord and satisfaction are not
limited to specific persons. {See § I. B., above.)
Bodell argues that Robbins cannot benefit from the Settlement Agreement
because he is not a party to it. Bodell misreads the cases upon which it relies in
support of its argument. Those cases do not support the position that an accord and
satisfaction cannot benefit non-parties. Indeed, some of the cases cited by Bodell
support Robbins5 position that an accord and satisfaction resolves a dispute as to all
persons.
For example, Bodell cites Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d 1200 (Utah 1987)
for the proposition that, absent a clear intent from the parties to the agreement, a nonparty cannot benefit from an accord and satisfaction. In fact, what Killian stands for
is nothing more than that a certain Mr. Killian could not invoke the protection of an
3 In Killian v. Oberhansly, two partners incurred a net loss of over One Hundred
Thousand Dollars in their dairy business. Partner A offered to pay the outstanding
grain bill if Partner B would pay the outstanding hay bill. Partner B refused the
offer. When Partner A sued Partner B to recover the net loss, Partner B asserted
accord and satisfaction as a defense The court found that there was no evidence
that the proposed offer, which was not accepted, was an accord and satisfaction as
to the debts of the partnership. Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d at 1200-02.
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accord and satisfaction because there was no accord and satisfaction in the first place.
As the Utah Supreme Court noted at the outset of its opinion, "[t]he issues raised are
factual." Id. Thus, the court's holding that there was "clearly substantial evidence to
support the trial court's finding that there was no accord and satisfaction," is entirely
unhelpful to the issue at hand.
Likewise, Bodell's reliance on Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Shuster, 811 P.2d 81, 8283 (N.M. 1991), is unfounded.4 It does not support the contention that an accord and
satisfaction cannot benefit a non-party. Rather, Fleet stands for the unremarkable
proposition that "one who is not a party to a contract cannot maintain a suit upon it."
Id. at 49 (emphasis added). In other words, "[a]ccord and satisfaction is an
affirmative defense." Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277
(Utah 1980).
The case of Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277-78
(Utah 1980), cited by Bodell, is also inapposite. It does not even address whether an

4 In Fleet, two homeowners defaulted on their mortgage agreement. The
homeowners divorced, and a court awarded the home to Homeowner A.
Homeowner A entered an accord and satisfaction with the mortgagor which
required Homeowner B to execute a quit claim deed. Homeowner B did execute
the quit claim deed. However, Homeowner B asserted contract and tort claims
against the mortgagor based on the accord and satisfaction. The court held that
Homeowner B could not maintain an action based on the accord and satisfaction
because she was not a party to it, even if she was an incidental beneficiary. Fleet
Mortg. Corp. v. Shuster, 811 P.2d 81.
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accord extends to non-parties.5 Nor does Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah
1983), advance BodelPs argument.6
Luxemburg v. Can-Tex Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804 (Minn. 1977), cited by Bodell,
actually supports the position taken by Robbins. In Luxemburg, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota applied well-established Minnesota law in holding that a discharge of one
tortfeasor will discharge all others if the settlement agreement manifests such intent or
if the plaintiff receives full satisfaction in law or in fact. Id. The Court reaffirmed a
prior holding that:

5 In Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., the debtor purchased a vehicle from
creditors, who financed debtor's purchase. While he owned the vehicle, the debtor
leased the truck to a trucking company owned by the creditors. Eventually, debtor
sold the vehicle back to creditors pursuant to a written agreement providing that
debtor "releases all equity and interest" to creditors. When debtor brought an
action against the trucking company to recover lease payments, the trucking
company asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. Holding that there was
no evidence that the debtor and creditor reached an agreement as to the amount
owing under the lease agreement, the court ruled that there was not an accord and
satisfaction as to that claim. Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc. 615 P.2d
1276.
6 In Dillman v. Foster, the plaintiffs claimed that they mistakenly conveyed real
property to the defendant. In support of their claim, plaintiffs provided evidence
that the defendant executed a settlement agreement with a title company,
presumably to resolve the title company's potential liability. The settlement
agreement transferred certain lots to the defendant, and further provided that the
settlement agreement would in no way affect the defendant's claim to the disputed
property. Plaintiffs argued that the settlement agreement proved that the property
had been mistakenly conveyed, and that plaintiff had accepted the lots in accord
and satisfaction of his claim. As in Fleet Mortgage Corp., discussed above, the
court held that the plaintiffs were not parties to the transaction. (The plaintiffs had
not raised accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense, but as the basis of
their claim against defendant.) The court ultimately ruled that plaintiffs claims to
the property were barred by the statute of limitations. 656 P.2d 974.
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where one joint tortfeasor is released, regardless of what form that
release may take, as long as it does not constitute and accord and
satisfaction or an unqualified or absolute release, and there is no
manifestation of any intention to the contrary in the agreement, the
injured party should not be denied his right to pursue the remaining
wrongdoers until he has received full satisfaction.
Id. at 807-8 {quoting Gronquist v. Olson, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Minn. 1954)
(emphasis added). Thus, under Luxemburg, an accord and satisfaction fully discharges
a dispute and provides protection to those who are not a party to the agreement.
In short, little or none of the authority cited by Bodell applies to, much less
supports, its contention that an accord and satisfaction bars tort claims against those
who are not parties to the agreement. In fact, the lion's share of BodelPs argument is
directed towards the notion that the trial court should have looked behind the plain
terms of the Settlement Agreement to determine the parties' intent.
But this is not the law. "If the court finds the agreement is integrated, then
parol evidence may be admitted only if the court makes a subsequent determination
that the language of the agreement is ambiguous." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren,
2008 UT 20 % 11, 182 P.3d 326. In this case, the trial court found the Settlement
Agreement, which contains an integration clause, to be "unambiguous and clear." (R.
at 6022.)
D.

The Settlement Agreement Discharges BodelPs Claims
Against Robbins Despite Utah's Statutory Limitation
on Discharge of Joint Tortfeasors.

The Liability Reform Act does not govern the Settlement Agreement because
the agreement is an accord and satisfaction. The Liability Reform Act, Utah Code
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Section 78-27-37 to -43, limits the general discharge of persons to those specifically
identified.7 However, the statute does not apply to all releases. See, e.g., Peterson v.
Coca-Cola USA, 2002 Utah 42 \ 7, 48 P.3d 941, 945 (holding that, where defendant is
sued under a theory of vicarious liability, the Joint Obligations Act applies to the
interpretation of a release); Nelson v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 935 P.2d 512
(Utah 1997) (holding that the Joint Obligations Act, rather than the Liability Reform
Act, applies to the discharge of an entity alleged to be vicariously liable for the
conduct of its agent). See also Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005 UT 85 ^f 10, 128 P.3d at
1149 (holding that the comparative fault provision of the Liability Reform Act does
not implicate civil conspiracy "due to its nature as a cause of action distinguishable,
independent, and unrelated to tort law").
An accord and satisfaction is a particular type of agreement, requiring three
elements in addition to those of general contract formation. (See § I. A., above.) An
accord and satisfaction is different than a common release. See Luxenburg v. Can-Tex
Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804 (Minn. 1977) (stating that "as long as [a settlement] does not
constitute an accord and satisfaction, the injured party should not be denied his right
to pursue the remaining wrongdoers until he has received full satisfaction"). A
release is "the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could
have been enforced." Black's Law Dictionary p. 1292 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, an

7 The Liability Reform Act provides, in relevant part, that: "A release given by a
person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other
defendant unless the release so provides." Utah Code § 78-27-42.
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accord and satisfaction is a distinct creature that fully disposes of a dispute - not just a
party - by discharging the entire underlying liability.
Bodell, MSF and Jenson wholly abrogated the Promissory Note and Guaranty,
agreed to accept substitute performance as provided in the Settlement Agreement, and
did, in fact receive the substitute performance. (R. at 3336-37.) The Settlement
Agreement and the consideration provided by the parties thereto, should be construed
as an accord and satisfaction, not merely a release, barring Bodell's claims against
Robbins and Bank One. The Liability Reform Act should not be extended to apply to
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Applying the Utah Liability Reform Act to an
accord and satisfaction here would effectively swallow the doctrine and unwisely
limit the ability of parties to negotiate settlements.
E.

The Settlement Agreement Eliminates Any Factual
Basis for Bodell's Claims Against Robbins.

The Settlement Agreement extinguishes Bodell's damages. Under Utah law,
there can only be one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. See Harris-Dudley
Plumbing Co. v. Prof I United World Travel Assoc, Inc., 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah
1979); Blodgett v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 903 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The recitations contained in the Settlement Agreement state that Bodell, MSF,
and Jenson settled all obligations between them, including the Promissory Note and
Guaranty. (R. at 3336.) In addition, the Settlement Agreement superseded all prior
agreements between them. (R. at 3337.) Bodell's damages theory relies exclusively
on the rights and obligations accorded under the Promissory Note and Guaranty. {See
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R. at 2994-3030.) Bodell contends that his damages are made up of "the funds
advanced, together with interest at the legal rate, less payment received from MSF."
(R. at 2895.) While brought under various theories, damages were related solely to
the obligations under the Promissory Note and Guaranty. Because those instruments
were fully settled and superseded, a claim upon them cannot stand.
Bodell elected its remedy in the form of the promises contained in the
Settlement Agreement and the satisfaction it received pursuant to those promises. It is
not entitled to any additional satisfaction on the transaction.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PORTIONS
OF THE TESTIMONY OF BODELL'S DAMAGES
EXPERT.

By order dated August 22, 2007, the trial court properly limited Weight's
expert testimony to the damages methodology that it had disclosed prior to the close
of fact discovery. (R. at 4766-69.) In reaching this ruling, the Court explicitly found
that Bodell had not disclosed its alternate damage theories, could not show good cause
for its failure to timely disclose its additional damage theories, and that its failure to
do so prejudiced the Defendants. (See R. at 4766-69.)
A.

Bodell Did Not Timely Disclose the Theories
upon which Weight Bases His Expert Report

Prior to the trial court's ruling, Bodell not only had the legal obligation to
disclose its alternative damage theories but had also been repeatedly asked to do so by
Defendants. Not only did Bodell fail to disclose its new theories, but it consistently
reaffirmed its original theory as the sole basis for its damage claims, namely, that its
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"damages constitutefd] the funds advanced, together with interest at the legal rate, less
payment received from MSF." (See, e.g., R. at 2895.)
Bodell never amended nor supplemented its initial disclosures to include new
damage theories. Bodell also failed to disclose its alternative damage calculations in
its September 22, 2004 responses to Robbins' first set of discovery requests:
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:
Describe in detail all of the damages
that you allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed
calculation of how you arrive at such damages and identifying all
witnesses, documents or other evidence that supports your claim for
such damages.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Bodell objects to this
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to
the extent that it calls for identification of "all witnesses, documents or
other evidence that supports your claim for such damages." Subject to
said objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as
follows: See Bodell's response to [Cherokee's] Interrogatory No. 4.
Bodell has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million
representing the amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan
to MSF to in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodell also contends
that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. Bodell also
contends that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. The documents
supporting this calculation of damages have already been produced.

REQUEST TFOR PRODUCTION! NO. 10:
[Please provide] [a]ll
documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, demonstrate, or pertain
to any damages you claim you have suffered.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10:
All non-privileged documents
within the scope of this request have already been produced.
(R. at 2923, 2927, emphasis added.) Bodell did not supplement these responses prior
to the ruling of the trial court.
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Bodell again failed to disclose its alternative damage calculations on May 24,
2004, when it served the following responses to Bank One's first set of discovery
requests. Rather, Bodell merely reiterated its original damage methodology:
REQUEST TFOR ADMISSION! NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails
on all claims, the only amounts Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank
One are the principal amount outstanding on the $4 million Bodell
Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 15-11 and 15-1-4, and costs of court.
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive
damages against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and
Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information
requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right to amend the
complaint and seek such punitive damages should subsequent discovery
so justify."
(R. at 2944.) Bodell even failed to identify its alternative theories when it did choose
to supplement its prior responses. On August 5, 2004, Bodell served a supplemental
response to Request for Admission No. 7:
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is in its infancy
and Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information
requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right to amend its
Complaint to seek punitive damages should subsequent discovery
justify such relief.
(R. at 2962.)
Bodell made no further supplementation to its response to Bank One's
Request for Admission No. 7.
(R. at 2962.)
Likewise, when Bodell served its responses to Cherokee's discovery requests,
it did not disclose any damage theory other than it had originally disclosed:
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State specifically the amount of money
Bodell contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this
action and explain in detail how that amount has been calculated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Bodell contends it is
entitled to recover from Cherokee & Walker the principal sum of $4
million representing the amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to
loan to Robbins and by which amount Bodell contends Cherokee &
Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is also entitled to
recover interest at the legal rate.
(R. at 2970.) Bodell never supplemented that response, either.
It was on this record that the trial court ruled that:
the defendants will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to present ,
[the additional] damages theories at trial because these claims and the
bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and defendants
are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories. Bodell
has offered no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior
to the close of fact discovery. Bodell will only be allowed to present
evidence at trial on the one theory of damages that was previously
disclosed, namely, that the damages are $4 million, less payments
received, plus interest at the statutory rate.
(R. at 4767.) Utah law makes clear that the trial court did not err in reaching its
conclusion to exclude portions of Weight's testimony.
B.

The Trial Court's Order Is Reviewed under
an Abuse of Discretion Standard.

"With regard to the admissibility of expert testimony, '[t]he trial court has
wide discretion ... and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard/" Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237 U 12, 74 P.3d 635 (internal
quotations and citations omitted)). Under an abuse of discretion standard, an
appellate court will not "reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
unless the decision 'exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Id.; see also State v. Hollen,
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2002 UT 35 f 66, 44 P.3d 794. In other words, "a trial court's decision will be
overturned only if there was no reasonable basis for the decision." Tschaggeny v.
Millbank, Ins, Co,, 2007 UT 37 % 163, 16 P.3d 615 (emphasis added); see also State v,
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^ 101, 63 P.3d 731 (characterizing standard as "no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the trial court"); Parker v, Parker, 2000 UT
App 30 T| 6, 996 P.2d 565 (referring to standard as "highly deferential"); Kunzler v.
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("We will not overturn a trial judge's
determination unless it is so unreasonable that it can be classified as . . . a clear abuse
of discretion.")
C.

Because Bodell Did Not Comply with Its Disclosure
Requirements under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Exclusion of Evidence of the Additional
Damage Theories Was Mandatory.

Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to include as part
of its initial disclosures,
a computation of any category of damages claimed by a disclosing
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and
extent of injuries suffered....
Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further provides:
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as
required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted
to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose.
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Utah R. C. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). Or, as the Advisory Committee phrased it, "[i]f
a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to
prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless or
there is good cause for the failure." Utah R. Civ. P. 37, advisory committee's note
(emphasis added). Authorities interpreting the similar federal rule have described the
sanctions as being "self-executing" and "automatic." See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37
advisory committee's note. See also NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Company,
227 F.3d 776 , 785-86 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Bodell seeks to avoid the self-executing nature of Rule 37(f) by arguing that
that it did, in fact, timely disclose the existence of its additional damage theories. In
support of this claim, Bodell points to its response to a request for admission in which
it acknowledged that the only pre-judgment interest it would be seeking was that
provided by Utah Code Section 15-1-1 which allows parties to a contract to establish
their own governing rate of interest.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 15-l-l(l)-(2), to which Bodell turns for aid, states:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action that is the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless the parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
Bodell urges that its discovery responses did not refer to the ten-percent
statutory default rate, but rather to the contractual rate of interest in the Promissory
Note between Bodell and MSF. Significantly, Bodell fails to note the dispositive
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point that Defendants were not parties to the contract. The plain-language of the
statute does not empower a party to a contract to enforce an interest rate agreed upon
between parties to a contract upon a third party. A non-party to an agreement is not
bound by an agreement among other parties for a rate of interest other than the default
legal rate. While Utah law appears not to have specifically addressed the issue, courts
in other jurisdictions have interpreted similar statutes in this manner. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Okatie Hotel Group, 641 S.E.2d 459,464 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that suit to
enforce lien by subcontractor against owner and general contractor that owner was
bound to statutory, not contractual, interest rate, where only general contractor and
subcontractor agreed to higher interest rate); Cassacia v. Habel, 303 N.E.2d 548, 551
(111. App. Ct. 1973) (holding homeowner subject only to statutory, not contractual,
rate of interest in action for unlawful detainer where lender held home in trust and
extended loan to homeowner by borrowing money from another source at a high
interest rate through contract with a third-party lender).
BodelFs after-the-fact attempt to expand its damage theory to encompass more
than it originally identified is without merit. Prior to the Weight Report, Bodell
disclosed only one damage theory. Thus, under the self-executing character of Rule
37(f), the new theories advanced in the Weight Report must be excluded.
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D.

The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion When It
Concluded that Bodell Did Not Show that It Had Good
Cause for Its Failure to Disclose Its Additional Damage
Theories or that the Failure Was Harmless*

In order to overcome the mandatory exclusion requirement of Rule 37(f), it is
the dilatory party's burden to demonstrate that it had good cause for its failure to
disclose or that the failure was harmless. The trial court was well within its broad
discretion when it concluded that Bodell had failed to demonstrate either.
The burden to demonstrate that it had good cause for its failure to comply with
the disclosure and supplementation requirements falls squarely on Bodell. See Utah
R. Civ. Pro. 37(f). On this point, Bodell appears to have all but acquiesced, devoting
only one footnote to the issue in its brief. There, Bodell argues little more than that
the approach it took was "typical." (Bodell's Brief at 28 n. 12.) Whether a practice is
typical is, however, not the test of whether it comports with the law and cannot form a
reasonable basis to set aside the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court was not
persuaded by this argument, and its conclusion can in no way be said to 'exceed[] the
limits of reasonability.'" Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App. 237 ^ 12, 74 P.3d 635.
Bodell also bore the burden of convincing the trial court that its failure to
disclose was harmless. See Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001); Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d.630, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).8 However, Bodell did not meet this burden. It hardly seems

8 "Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules.
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controversial that "a defendant is entitled to know which method [of damages] ...
plaintiff is choosing in this case, and to know in time to prepare a defense." Precision
Seed Co. v. Consol Grain & Barge Co., Docket No.3:03-CV-079, 2006 WL 1281689,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29520 *17 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2006) (striking new damages
theories not previously disclosed). In order to adequately prepare his case for trial,
Robbins would need to conduct significant fact discovery on Bodell's late-hour
disclosure of its additional three damage theories. At the very minimum, Robbins
would need to conduct discovery on Bodell's loan history and the loan histories and
practices of those to whom Bodell could and would allegedly loaned money in lieu of
MSF. He would need to conduct discovery, through MSF, Jenson, and third parties,
as to the capabilities of MSF and Jenson to repay or obtain financing to repay the $4
million loan at the time the loan was made. He would also have to conduct discovery,
including discovery of non-party financial institutions, regarding Bodell's expenses,
investments, and credit history. Of course, inquiry into these areas almost certainly
would lead to several new avenues of discovery that would need to be explored.
Bodell would have to do this and probably more. But fact discovery was closed.
Bodell's failure to disclose its damage theories until after the close of fact discovery
would have severely prejudiced Robbins if the trial court had not excluded the new
damage theories. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to exclude portions of
Weight's expert testimony should be affirmed.

Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2002 UT 54 f 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 (citations
omitted).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth here, Robbins urges this Court to affirm the judgment
of the trial court in dismissing the claims asserted against Robbins and affirming the
order of the trial court in excluding portions of Weight's expert testimony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on June 2, 2008.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

By:

S

*

—

Andrew G. Deiss
Billie J. Siddoway
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Mark K Robbins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 2nd day of June, 2008, two true
and correct copies of Brief of Appellee Mark H. Robbins were served by handdelivery to each of the following:
John A. Beckstead
Douglas Owens
HOLLAND & HART
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Bank One Utah

James S. Jardine
Matthew R. Lewis
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Bodell Construction Company

ka&:
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ADDENDUM

Reproduction of opinions appealed:
A.

Revised Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
of 11/5/07 (R. at 6020-25)

B.

Order Granting Mark Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony of Merrill Weight of 8/22/07 (R. at 4766-69)

Reproduction of contract at issue:
C.

Promissory Note (R. at 2238-39)

D.

Guaranty (R. at 2240-42)

E.

Settlement Agreement (R. at 3336-38)

Reproduction of determinative statutes, or rules:
F.

Utah Code §15-1-1

G.

Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26

H.

Utah R. Civ. Pro. 37

Reproduction of unpublished opinions:
I.

Precision Seed Co. v. Consol. Grain & Barge Co., Docket
No.3:03-CV-079, 2006 WL 1281689, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29520 *17 (S.D. Ohio May 6,2006)

2
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John A. Beckstead, #0263
H. Douglas Owens, #7762
Romaine C. Marshall, #9654

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

HOLLAND & HART LLP

NOV 0 5 IM?

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Telephone: (801)799-5800
Fax: (801)799-5700

SALT L M A t y c < U 4 i i

By

_ _ U

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as successor to Bank One, N.A.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a ! REVISED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
Utah corporation,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 030917018
V.

Hon. John Paul Kennedy
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE & WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; BANK ONE,
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
national banking association, and DOES 1
through 50,
Defendant.

The following Motions for Summary Judgment were filed in this action:
1.

Motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud

Claim dated November 29, 2006 (the "Fraud Summary Judgment Motion").

3772I77_6.DOC
SLCJ 25844

2.

Mark Robbins Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 29, 2007 (the

"Robbins Motion").
3.

Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fraud and Negligent

Misrepresentation Claims dated July 2, 2007 (the "Bank One Motion").
4.

Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs

Fraud Claims dated July 9, 2007 (the "Robbins Joinder").
Hearing on the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion was held before this Court on April 6,
2007 and the Motion was taken under advisement.
Hearing on the Bank One Motion and the Robbins Motion was held before this Court on
September 10, 2007. At that time, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda
on the issue of the Court's authority to reconsider the order previously entered by Judge William
Bohling and scheduled further oral argument.
The further oral argument was held October 3, 2007. Appearing at that argument were
James Jardine and Matthew Lewis of Ray Quinney & Nebeker on behalf of Bodell Construction
Company ("Bodell"), John A. Beckstead and Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart on behalf of
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), and David
W. Tufts and Jason R. Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar and Andrew Deiss of Jones Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins").
Having reviewed the Memoranda and Exhibits filed by the parties in support of and in
opposition to these Motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and good cause
appearing, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows:

3772177_6.DOC
SLCJ25844
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1.

The Court finds that it has authority to reconsider an earlier order of the Court

where there is a basis to believe the earlier order is in error and final judgment has not been
entered. The Court finds that the Order dated March 15, 2004 entered by the Hon. William
Bohling is in error and it is therefore proper for this Court to reconsider the accord and
satisfaction arguments which were the subject of the March 15, 2004 Order.
2.

The Bank One Motion is hereby granted. The ground upon which the Bank One

Motion is granted is that the Settlement Agreement dated March 18, 2003, between Bodell
Construction Company, Michael Bodell, MSF Properties, LC, and Marc S. Jenson (the
"Settlement Agreement") constitutes an accord and satisfaction and the Court makes the
following findings, together with findings stated in the record:
a.

The Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and clear.

b.

The Settlement Agreement includes the settlement of liquidated and

unliquidated claims.
c.

The Settlement Agreement was drafted by lawyers and the parties are

sophisticated businessmen.
d.

The Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction.

e.

The existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown within the "four

corners" of the Settlement Agreement.
f.

An accord and satisfaction operates for the benefit of third parties and

encompasses all claims pending before the Court, including the claims for fraud and negligent

3772177_6.DOC
SLCJ 25844
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misrepresentation asserted against Bank One and the claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, and
unjust enrichment asserted against Robbins.
3.

The Court finds that Robbins has properly joined in the Bank One Motion. All of

the bases for granting the Bank One Motion with respect to the claims asserted against Bank One
apply to the claims asserted against Robbins.
4.

The Court declines to rule on the other arguments in the Bank One Motion, in the

Robbins Motion, and in the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion.
5.

The trial date of October 22, 2007, and all other dates and deadlines set by the

Court are hereby vacated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November J>

, 2007.

Approved as to form:

S. Jard
fatthew R. Lewis
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company

3772177_6.DOC
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David W\ TVifts
Jason R Hull
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P C
Attorneys for Defendant Mark H Robbins

John A B^ckstead
H Douglas Owens
Romaine C Marshall
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N A, successor by merger to Bank One, N A
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on November >£

, 2007,1 served a copy of the foregoing document to the

following by:
James S. Jardine
Matthew L. Lewis

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Email

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

36 S. State Street #1400
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
David W. Tufts
Jason R. Hull

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Email

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
P. (X Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
James S. Lowrie
Andrew G. Deiss

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Email

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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3772177_6.DOC
SLCJ 25844

6

TabB

FILED DISTRICT COURT

David W. Tufts (8736)
Erik A. Olson (8479)
Jason R.Hull (11202)

Third Judicial District

AUG 2 2 2007

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
(801)415-3000
(801) 415-3500 fax

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for defendant Mark H. Robbins

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER GRANTING
MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
MERRILL WEIGHT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

Case No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

On July 27, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., the Court heard oral arguments on (1) Defendant Mark
Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight; and (2) Defendant Mark
Robbins' Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Defendant JPMorgan

SLC 104492
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Chase Bank, N A , successor by merger to Bank One, N A ("Bank One") joined in both of these
motions Robert J Shelby of Burbidge Mitchell & Gross appeared on behalf of Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell") H Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart LLP appeared on
behalf of Bank One David W Tufts and lason R Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar PC appeared
on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins") Having reviewed the papers filed by the
parties in support and opposition to these motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel,
and good cause appeanng, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows
1

Motion to Exclude Weight Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of

Merrill Weight is GRANTED Bodell will not be allowed to present testimony at trial to
support those claims for damages that are advanced in the expert leport of Merrill Weight
relating to the Benefit of the Bargain theory, the Modified Benefit of the Bargain theory, the
Reasonable Rate of Return theory, and claims for Consequential Damages The Court holds that
the defendants will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to present these damages theories at
trial because these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and
defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories Bodell has offered
no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior to the close of fact discovery Bodell
will only be allowed to present evidence at tnal on the one theory of damages that was
previously disclosed, namely, that the damages are $4 million, less payments received, plus
interest at the statutory rate BodelFs ability to seek punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs
under this theory of damages for the alleged fraud was not considered by the Court in this motion
and is therefore not precluded by this order

SLC 104492
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The Court declines to reach the questions of the legal and factual viability of the
various theories asserted by Mr. Weight. Those issues were briefed, but the Court finds that it is
unnecessary to rule on those issues at this time in light of the Court's decision to exclude the
testimony of Mr Weight on the grounds described above.
2.

Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Robbins'

Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines was asserted in the alternative
and is moot because the Court has granted the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill
Weight.
3.

Other Issues. Bodell is permitted to provide a revised expert report from Merrill

Weight on the damage theory that Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company is entitled to $4
million, less payments received, plus interest at the statutory rate. Mr. Weight's revised expert
report shall be served on the defendants not later than Friday, August 3, 2007. Thereafter,
defendants shall have until August 31, 2007, to depose Mr. Weight and to serve rebuttal reports
to Mr. Weight's revised expert report. Bodell shall have until September 14, 2007, to depose this
expert designated by the defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August

2^2007.

Approved as to form:

Robert J. Shelby
Burbidge & Mitttfell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co.

SLC 104492

A. Beckstead
I. Douglas Owens
Holland & Hart
Attorneys for Defendant Bank One, N. A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this x'J day of August, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be delivered via hand delivery to the following-

Richard D. Burbidge
Robert Shelby
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Holland & Hart LLP
60 E. South temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1031
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PROMISSORY NOTE

$4,000,000.00

August 30, 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah

1. Promise to Pay. For value received, MSF PROPERTIES,
L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, (hereinafter Maker"),
promises to pay to the order of Bodell Construction Company, a
Utah Corporation and its successors and assigns (hereinafter
"Payee"), at 586 Fine Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, or at
such other place as Payee may from time to time designate, in
lawful money of the United States of America, the principal sum
of FOUR MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/CENTS ($4,000,000.00), plus
interest as computed below. Maker also agrees to pay $80,000.00
as a loan fee, payable on the due date of this note.
2.
Interest. The outstanding balance of the Principal
Indebtedness shall bear interest from the date hereof at the rate
of ONE PERCENT (1.0%) per week, or any portion of a week for
which any principal balance is outstanding. Interest shall
accrue weekly on the outstanding balance of the Principal
Indebtedness at the start of the week.
3.
Interest and Payments. The total Principal
Indebtedness and all accrued and unpaid interest thereon and the
loan fee shall be due and payable in full on or before September
30, 2000.
4.
Late Charge. If Maker fails to make any payment of
interest or principal within fifteen (15) days from the date on
which the same is due and payable, a late charge with respect to
such payment shall be due and payable to cover, in part, the
extra expense of handling such delinquent payment. Such late
charge shall be equal to one percent (1%) of such payment.
5.
Prepayment. Maker reserves the right to prepay all or
part of the Principal Indebtedness owing on this Promissory Note
at any time or times prior to maturity without notice and without
payment of any premium or penalty.
6.
Application of Payments. Any and all payments by Maker
under this Promissory Note shall be applied as follows: First, to
the payment of any late charges; Second, to the payment of
accrued interest on the Principal Indebtedness; Third, to the
payment of the Principal Indebtedness, and Finally to the payment
of the loan fee.
7.
Extension. The time for any payment required hereunder
may be extended from time to time at the election o£ Paye^T""
1
EXHIBIT

532.

cwooBW

Acceptance by Payc of additional security or b grantees for the
performance of the terms and provisions herein contained shall
not in any way affect the liability of Maker.
8.
Default. If Maker fails (a) to pay any suras herein
specified when due where such default is not cured, or (b) to
perform any obligation provided to be satisfied or performed
under any instrument given to secure payment of the obligations
evidenced hereby if not satisfied or performed at the time and in
the manner required, the entire unpaid Principal Indebtedness,
together with all accrued and unpaid interest thereon, plus any
unpaid loan fee shall, at the election of Payee, become
immediately due and payable, and any sum not so paid when due
shall bear interest at the interest rate provided in Paragraph 2
above plus zero percent (0%) per annum, both before and after
judgement. In addition thereto, there shall be due and payable
all reasonable costs of collection or other Costs incurred in th£
protection of the interests of Payee, including, but not limited
to, reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by Payee if this
Promissory Note is referred to an attorney for collection.
9.
Governing Law. This Promissory Note is to be construed
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
10.
Successors and Assigns. Except as otherwise provided
herein, the provisions hereof shall inure to the benefit of, and
be binding upon, the successors, assigns, heirs, executors and
administrators of the parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Promissory Note has been duly
executed as of this 3Oh day of August, 2 000.
MSF Properties, L.C.

/v\/Vzc T ^ ^ ^

j

(A^^^~

P^int name and title
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GUARANTY
This Guaranty is made as of the 30th day of August, 2000, by Marc S. Jenson
("Guarantor'1), whose notice address is 5326 S. Northwood Rd., Salt Lake City, Utah and
Bodell Construction Company ("Lender"), whose notice address is 586 West Fine Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84115.
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, simultaneously with the delivery of this Guaranty, the Lender has extended
a loan ("Loan") to MSF Properties, L.C., (the "Borrower") pursuant to a Promissory Note
(referred to collectively as the Loan Documents) in the principal amount of Four Million
Dollars (S 4,000,000.00); and
WHEREAS, this Agreement is executed and delivered to the Lender by the Guarantor to
induce the lender to make the Loan and in satisfaction of a material condition precedent to such
extension of credit by the Lender to Borrower,
NOW, THEREFORE, is consideration of the Loan by the Lender to the Borrower and
the benefits to be derived by the Guarantor therefrom, it is agreed as follows:
i. The Guarantor unconditionally guarantees to the lender the following (hereinafter
referred to collectively as the "Obligations'1): the full and prompt payment by
Borrower, in lawful money of the United States, when due, whether at maturity or by
acceleration or otherwise, of all of the Borrower's present and future indebtedness
and obligations under the Promissory Note and all modifications, extensions and
renewal thereof, whether for principal, interest or otherwise, and whether absolute or
contingent, primary or secondary.
2. The Obligations of the Guarantor hereunder are primary, absolute, unconditional,
continuing guaranty of payment and performance by the Guarantor and will not
terminate until the Borrower has paid in full all amounts owing to the Lender and has
performed all of the Borrower's obligations under the Loan Documents.
3. The Guarantor agrees that the Guarantor's liability hereunder will not be released,
reduced, impaired or affected by any one or more of the following events: the
assumption of liability by any other person (whether as guarantor or otherwise) for
payment or performance under the Loan Documents: the subordination,
relinquishment or discharge of the Lender's rights relating to the Loan Documents;
the full or partial release from liability of the Borrower or any other person now or
hereafter liable for payment or performance under the Loan Documents; the
insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, discharge, waiver or other exoneration of the
Borrower or any other person now or hereafter liable or payment or performance
under the Loan Documents; the renewal consolidation, extension, modification,
rearrangements or amendment from time to time of the Note; the failure, delay,
waiver or refusal by the Lender to exercise any right or remedy held by the Lender
under the Loan Documents; the sale, encumbrance, transfer or other modification of

CW000299

condition or nnanagement of the Borrower, the inv°l»ditv, unenforceability or
insufficiency
-sxy one or more of the Loan Doa
or the failure of the
Guarantor to receive notice of any one or more of the foregoing actions or events.
4. The Lender may, at the Lender's option, upon the occurrence of any failure of
performance by the Borrower, proceed to enforce this Agreement directly against the
Guarantor without first proceeding against the Borrower.
5. Guarantor waives diligence, presentment, protest, notice of dishonor, demand for
payment, notice of nonpayment or nonperformance, notice of acceptance of this
Agreement and all other notice of any nature. Guarantor agrees that any rights which
the Guarantor might now or hereafter hold against the Borrower will be subordinate,
junior and inferior to all rights which the Lender might now or hereafter hold against
the Borrower.
6. Guarantor agrees that in any action brought to enforce this Agreement, the Guarantor
will pay to the Lender the reasonable attorney's fees, court costs and other expenses
incurred by the Lender.
7. In the event of any Default under the Loan Documents or any default under this
Agreement, the Lender will be entitled to selectively and successively enforce any
one or more of the rights held by the Lender and such action will not be deemed a
waiver of any otherrightheld by the Lender. All of the remedies of the Lender under
this Agreement and the Loan Department are cumulative and not alternative.
8. This Agreement has been negotiated and delivered in Salt Lake City, and is intended
to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. The Guarantor
hereby irrevocably waives all rights to trial by jury in any action, proceeding or
counterclaim arising out of or relating to this Guaranty.
9. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in
any respect or application for any reason, such invalidity, illegality or
unenforceability will not effect any other provisions herein contained and such
provisions will remain in full force and effect
10. This Agreement cannot be amended except by an agreement in writing signed by the
Guarantor and the Lender.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Guarantor has duly executed this instrument the date
first above written.

MarkJMqisoj

C
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STATE OF UTAF
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss

)

The foregoing bstrument was acknowledged before me this J O day
of
J
2000 by:
~

Notary Public p

My Commission Expires:

Crl'dOoQ

KABUV-SPHOUL

,

SiftUbCX/.UtahMflS
MyCo<nffl2»feA&pbu
Jur»7,»04

.
I

State of Utah

I
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (tins {KAgrecmcnC) is entered into this 18th day of March,
2003, by and among BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah corporation ("BCC"), MICHAEL
BODELL, an individual ("Bodcir), MARC S. JENSON, an individual ("Jenson"), and MSF
PROPERTIES, L.C, a Utah limited liability company ("MSF71)
WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain loans to MSF (the "Loans"); and
WHEREAS, Jenson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF under the Loans; and
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against the amounts outstanding under the Loans,
but is currently in'default under the Loans; and
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the covenants and
obligations set forth below, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows;
1.
Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, MSF has caused
$3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be delivered to BCC. BCC hereby acknowledges receipt of
such funds.
2.
Each of BodeJLand BCC, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges
MSF, its affiliates and dieir respective members, managers, officers, employees and agents (each,
including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Patty") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud,
charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Cfcrfm"), arising out of all past affiliations
and transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all
related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and
repaid in foil; provided that suoh releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in
tins Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof*
3.
Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under biro, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges
BCC, its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents (each, including without
limitation Bodell, a "Bodell Partf})% from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party including, but not limited to, the Loans and all
related arrangements and transactions; provided that such releases shajl not apply to any obligation of
BCC or Bodell set forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery
hereof.
4.
Each of the parties be/eto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the provisions hereof; it
shall keep confidential the execution, terms and existence of this Agreement, the consideration exchanged
herein, and all other matters in connection with this Agreement; provided that any party may (upon
performance by the parties of the respective deliveries to be made hereunder) disclose that MSF. Jenson
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as o f tho date first set forth
above.
"Bodell":

k>XJMw_

Michael Bodell

"BCCM
Bodell Construction Company

Bv
e: hltfimjL-j;
Name;
&&&XTitle:
t£8&&3Vr

"Jenson":

"MSF":
MSF Properties, L.C.
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CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

601
15-11

Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate.

(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods,
or chose in action that is the subject of their contract
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different
rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be
10% per annum
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to
affect any penalty or interest charge t h a t by law applies to
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations
made before May 14, 1981
1989
15-1-2, 15-l-2a.

Repealed.

1969

15-1-3 C a l c u l a t e d b y t h e y e a r .
Whenever in anv statute or deed or written or verbal
contract, or in any public or private instrument whatever, any
certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is
stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned by
the year
1953
15-1-4. I n t e r e s t o n j u d g m e n t s .
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgment interest
rate" means the interest rate established for the federal court
system under 28 U S C Sec 1961, as amended
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2Kb), a judgment
rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the
parties, which shall be specified in the judgment
(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan
subject to Title 7, Chapter 23, Check Cashing Registra
tion Act, shall bear interest a t the rate imposed under
Subsection (3) on an amount not exceeding the sum of
d) the total of the principal balance of the deferred
deposit loan,
(n) interest at the rate imposed by the deferred
deposit loan agreement for a period not exceeding 12
weeks as provided in Subsection 7-23-105(4),
(in) costs,
(IV) attorney fees, and
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by
the court
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other civil and
cnmmal judgments of the district court and justice court
shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest
rate as of J a n u a r y 1 of each year, plus 2%
(b) The postjudgment interest rate in effect a t the time
of the judgment shall remain the interest r a t e for the
duration of the judgment
(c) The interest on criminal judgments shall be calculated on the total amount of t h e judgment
(d) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited m
accordance with Section 63A-8-301
(e) Interest paid on revenue to a county or municipality
shall be paid to the general fund of the county or municipality
2006
15-1-5 t o 15-1-10. R e p e a l e d .

1955,1969

15-3-3

15-2-1 P e r i o d of m i n o r i t y .
The period of minority extends in males and females to the
age of eighteen years, but all minors obtain their majority by
marriage It is further provided t h a t courts in divorce actions
may order support to age 21
1975
15-2-2.

L i a b i l i t y for n e c e s s a r i e s a n d o n c o n t r a c t s —
Disaffirmance.
A minor is bound not only for reasonable value of necessaries but also by his contracts, unless he disaffirms them
before or within a reasonable time after he attains his majority and restores to the other party all money or property
received by him by virtue of said contracts and remaining
within his control a t any time after attaining his majority
1953

15-2-3 L i m i t a t i o n o n r i g h t t o disaffirm.
No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on
account of the mmor's own misrepresentations as to his
majority or from his having engaged m busmess as adult, the
other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of
contracting
1953
15-2-4. P a y m e n t for p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s .
When a contract for the personal services of a minor has
been made with him alone, and those services are afterward
performed, payment made therefor to such minor m accordance with the terms of the contract is a full satisfaction for
those services, and t h e parent or guardian cannot recover
therefor a second time
1953
15-2-5. B l o o d d o n a t i o n b y m i n o r .
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, any minor
who has reached the age of eighteen years may give consent to
the donation of his blood and to the necessary medical procedures to accomplish such donation Consent shall not be
subject to disaffirmance because of minority The consent of
the parent or parents of a minor shall not be necessary in
order to authorize the donation of blood and such medical
procedures
1971
CHAPTER 3
7NTERPARTY A G R E E M E N T S
Section
15-3-1
15-3-2
15-3-3
15-3-4

Conveyances, releases, sales by persons actmg
jointly
Contracts not discharged by merger in obligor and
obligee
Fraudulent transactions not validated
Effective date of chapter

15-3-1.

Conveyances, releases, sales by p e r s o n s acting
jointly.
A conveyance, release or sale may be made to or by two or
more persons acting jointly and one or more, but less t h a n all,
of these persons acting either by himself or themselves or with
other persons, and a contract may be made between such
parties
1953

CHAPTER 2
15-3-2.

L E G A L CAPACITY O F C H I L D R E N
Section
1S-2-L
*M-2
**j**2-3
*j«-4*
#•2-5

Period of minority
Liability for necessaries and on contracts — Disaffirmance
Limitation on right to disaffirm
Payment for personal services
Blood donation by minor

C o n t r a c t s n o t d i s c h a r g e d b y m e r g e r in obligor
and. obligee.
No contract shall be discharged because after its formation
t h e obligation and the right thereunder become vested in the
same person, acting m different capacities as to the right and
the obhgation
1953
15-3-3. F r a u d u l e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s n o t v a l i d a t e d .
Nothing herein shall validate a transaction within its provisions which is actually or constructively fraudulent
1953
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ting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is
sought.
(d) Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances.
(dXD If a party challenges the constitutionality of a
statute in an action in which the Attorney General has
not appeared, the party raising the question of constitutionality shall notify the Attorney General of such
fact. The court shall permit the state to be heard upon
timely application.
(dX2) If a party challenges the constitutionality of a
county or municipal ordinance in an action in which
the county or municipal attorney has not appeared, the
party raising the question of constitutionality shall
notify the county or municipal attorney of such fact.
The court shall permit the county or municipality to be
heard upon timely application.
(dX3) Failure of a party to provide notice as required
by this rule is not a waiver of any constitutional
challenge otherwise timely asserted.
R u l e 25. S u b s t i t u t i o n o f p a r t i e s .
(a) Death.
(aXl) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the
proper parties. The motion for substitution may be
made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the
notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as
provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not
later than ninety days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of
the death as provided herein for the service of the
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
(aX2) In the event of the death of one or more of the
plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants in an
action in which the right sought to be enforced survives
only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the
surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The
death shall be suggested upon the record and the
action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving
parties.
(b) Incompetency. If a party becomes incompetent,
the court upon motion served as provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule may allow the action to be continued by or against his representative.
(c) Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of
interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party. Service of the motion shall be made as provided
in Subdivision (a) of this rule.
(d) Public officers; death or separation from office.
When a public officer is a party to an action and during
its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the action may be continued and maintained by
or against his successor, if within 6 months after the
successor takes office, it is satisfactorily shown to the
court that there is a substantial need for so continuing
and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant to this rule
may be made when it is shown by supplemental
pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action
of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the
party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assent-
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ing thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the
application therefor and accorded an opportunity to
object.
PART V. DEPOSITIONS A N D DISCOVERY
R u l e 26. General p r o v i s i o n s g o v e r n i n g discovery.
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(aXD Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt
under Subdivision (aX2) and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(aXIXA) the name and, if known, the address and
telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the
subjects of the information;
(aXIXB) a copy of, or a description by category and
location of, all discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible
things in the possession, custody, or control of the party
supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment;
(aXlXC) a computation of any category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party, making available for
inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which
such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(aXIXD) for inspection and copying as under Rule
34 any insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to
satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered
in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments
made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (aXD shall be made within 14 days after the
meeting of the parties under Subdivision (f). Unless
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties
shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being
served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on
the information then reasonably available and is not
excused from making disclosures because the party
has not fully completed the investigation of the case or
because the party challenges the sufficiency of another
party's disclosures or because another party has not
made disclosures.
(aX2) Exemptions.
(aX2XA) The requirements of Subdivision (aXD and
Subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(aX2XAXi) based on contract in which the amount
demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or less;
(aX2XAXii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative agency;
(aX2XAXiii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(aX2XAXiv) to enforce an arbitration award;
(aX2XAXv) for water rights general adjudication
under Title 73, Chapter 4; and
(aX2XAXvi) in which any party not admitted to
practice law in Utah is not represented by counsel.
(aX2XB) In an exempt action, the matters subject to
disclosure under subpart (aXD are subject to discovery
under subpart (b).
(aX3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
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(aX3XA) A party shall disclose to other parties the
identity of any person who may be used at trial to
present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
(aX3XB) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties
or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, with
respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose
duties as an employee of the party regularly involve
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written
report prepared and signed by the witness or party.
The report shall contain the subject matter on which
the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to
testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in
which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years.
(aX3XC) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties
or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by
Subdivision (aX3) shall be made within 30 days after
the expiration of fact discovery as provided by Subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to
contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3XB),
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other
party.
(aX4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to
other parties the following information regarding the
evidence that it may present at trial other than solely
for impeachment:
(aX4XA) the name and, if not previously provided,
the address and telephone number of each witness,
separately identifying witnesses the party expects to
present and witnesses the party may call if the need
arises;
(aX4XB) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a
deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and
(aX4XC) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other
evidence, separately identifying those which the party
expects to offer and those which the party may offer if
the need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (aX4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial.
Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is
specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list
disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a)
of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with
the grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C).
Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for
^ood cause shown.
(aX5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made
n writing, signed and served.
(aX6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties
nay obtain discovery by one or more of the following

16

methods: depositions upon oral examination or written
questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or
other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for
admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise
limited by order of the court in accordance with these
rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(bXD In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(bX2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party shall expressly make any
claim that the source is not reasonably accessible,
describing the source, the nature and extent of the
burden, the nature of the information not provided,
and any other information that will enable other
parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel
discovery or for a protective order, the party from
whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may
order discovery from such sources if the requesting
party shows good cause, considering the limitations of
subsection (bX3). The court may specify conditions for
the discovery.
(bX3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of
the discovery methods set forth in Subdivision (aX6)
shall be limited by the court if it determines that:
(bX3XA) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive;
(bX3XB) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or
(bX3XC) the discovery is unduly burdensome or
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties'
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under
Subdivision (c).
(bX4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (bX5) of this rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (bXD of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including the party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantia] equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
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such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter
previously made by that party. Upon request, a person
not a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter
previously made by that person. If the request is
refused, the person may move for a court order. The
provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply to the award of
expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made
is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted
or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making
it and contemporaneously recorded.
(bX5) Trial preparation:
Experts.
(bX5XA) A party may depose any person who has
been identified as an expert whose opinions may be
presented at trial. If a report is required under Subdivision (aX3XB), any deposition shall be conducted
within 60 days after the report is provided.
(bX5XB) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or
specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not
expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as
provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the
party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on
the same subject by other means.
(bX5XC) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(bXSXCXi) The court shall require that the party
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (bX5) of this rule; and
(bXSXCXii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (bX5XA) of this rule the court may
require, and with respect to discovery obtained under
Subdivision (bX5XB) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably
incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and
opinions from the expert.
(bX6) Claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation
materials.
(bX6XA) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these
rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to
protection as trial preparation material, the party
shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or things
not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected,
will enable other parties to assess the applicability of
the privilege or protection.
(bX6XB) Information produced. If information is
produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material,
the party making the claim may notify any party that
received the information of the claim and the basis for
it. After being notified, a party must promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any
copies it has and may not use or disclose the informa-
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tion until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may
promptly present the information to the court under
seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving
party disclosed the information before being notified, it
must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until the
claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by
the person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute
without court action, and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of
the following:
(cXD that the discovery not be had;
(cX2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of
the time or place;
(cX3) that the discovery may be had only by a
method of discovery other than that selected by the
party seeking discovery;
(cX4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain
matters;
(cX5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court;
(cX6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened
only by order of the court;
(cX7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(cX8) that the parties simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes
to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions
as are just, order that any party or person provide or
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply
to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for
cases exempt under Subdivision (aX2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party
may not seek discovery from any source before the
parties have met and conferred as required by Subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed
within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless
the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any
sequence and the fact that a party is conducting
discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise; shall
not operate to delay any other p a r t / s discovery.
(e) Supplementation
of responses. A party who has
made a disclosure under Subdivision (a) or responded
to a request for discovery with a response is under a
duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the
court or in the following circumstances:
(eXD A party is under a duty to supplement at
appropriate intervals disclosures under Subdivision (a)
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if the party learns that in some material respect the
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if
the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the
discovery process or in writing. With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is required
under Subdivision (aX3XB) the duty extends both to
information contained in the report and to information
provided through a deposition of the expert.
(eX2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a
prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that
the response is in some material respect incomplete or
incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other
parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under
Subdivision (aX2), except as otherwise stipulated or
directed by order.
(fXD The parties shall, as soon as practicable after
commencement of the action, meet in person or by
telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their
claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for
settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the
disclosures required by Subdivision (aXl), to discuss
any issues relating to preserving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the meeting. The attorneys
of record shall be present at the meeting and shall
attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan.
(fX2) The plan shall include:
(fX2XA) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under Subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures
under Subdivision (aXl) were made or will be made;
(fX2XB) the subjects on which discovery may be
needed, when discovery should be completed, whether
discovery should be conducted in phases and whether
discovery should be limited to particular issues;
(fX2XC) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information,
including the form or forms in which it should be
produced;
(fX2XD) any issues relating to claims of privilege or
of protection as trial-preparation material, including
— if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such
claims after production — whether to ask the court to
include their agreement in an order;
(fK2XE) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules, and
what other limitations should be imposed;
(fX2XF) the deadline for filing the description of the
factual and legal basis for allocating fault to a nonparty and the identity of the non-party; and
(fK2XG) any other orders that should be entered by
the court
(fX3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court
within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no
more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a
proposed form of order in conformity with the parties'
stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order
shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule
16tt>XlM6), except that the date or dates for pretrial
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be
scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to
the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the
plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for

18

entry of a discovery order on any topic on which the
parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered
by the court, the presumptions established by these
rules shall govern any subject not included within the
parties' stipulated discovery plan.
(fX4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule 16(b).
(fX5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties
is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and discovery
order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion
a modification of the discovery plan and order. The
stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable
time after joinder.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and
objections. Every request for discovery or response or
objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record or by the party if the party
is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the request, response,
or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2)
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response,
or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it
is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any
action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who made the certification, the
party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another
state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another
state may take the deposition of any person within this
state, in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided that in order to
obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such
deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of
the county in which the person whose deposition is to
be taken resides or is to be served, and provided
further that all matters arising during the taking of
such deposition which by the rules are required to be
submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court
in the county where the deposition is being taken.
(i) Filing.
(iXD Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party
shall not file disclosures or requests for discovery with
the court, but shall file only the original certificate of
service stating that the disclosures or requests for
discovery have been served on the other parties and
the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court, a party shall not file a response to a request for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original
certificate of service stating that the response has been
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served on the other parties and the date of service.
Except as provided in Rule 30(0(1), Rule 32 or unless
otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be
filed with the court.
(iX2) A party filing a motion under Subdivision (c) or
a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a
copy of the request for discovery or the response which
is at issue.
R u l e 27. D e p o s i t i o n s b e f o r e a c t i o n or p e n d i n g
appeal.
(a) Before action.
(aXl) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate
testimony regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of this state may file a verified petition
in the district court of the county in which any expected adverse party may reside.
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the
petitioner and shall state: (1) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of
this state but is presently unable to bring it or cause it
to be brought, (2) the subject matter of the expected
action and the petitioner's interest therein, (3) the
facts to be established by the proposed testimony and
the reasons to perpetuate it, (4) the names or a
description of the persons expected to be adverse
parties and their addresses so far as known, and (5) the
names and addresses of the persons to be examined
and the substance of the testimony expected to be
elicited from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons
to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose
of perpetuating their testimony.
(aX2) Notice and service. The petitioner shall thereafter serve a notice upon each person named in the
petition as an expected adverse party, together with a
copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner will
apply to the court, at a time and place named therein,
for the order described in the petition. At least 20 days
before the date of hearing the notice shall be served
either within or without the district or state in the
manner provided in Rule 4(d) for service of summons;
but if such service cannot with due diligence be made
upon any expected adverse party named in the petition, the court may make such order as is just for
service by publication or otherwise, and shall appoint,
for persons not served in the manner provided in Rule
4(d), an attorney who shall represent them, and, in
case they are not otherwise represented, shall crossexamine the deponent. If any expected adverse party is
a minor or incompetent the provisions of Rule 17(c)
apply.
(aX3) Order and examination. If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay ofjustice, it shall make an order
designating or describing the persons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of
the examination and whether the depositions shall be
taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance
with these rules; and the court may make orders of the
character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For the
purpose of applying these rules to depositions for
perpetuating testimony, each reference therein to the
court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to
refer to the court in which the petition for such
deposition was filed.

Rule 28

(aX4) Use of deposition. If a deposition to perpetuate
testimony is taken under these rules or if, although not
so taken, it would be admissible in evidence in the
courts of the state in which it is taken, it may be used
in any action involving the same subject matter subsequently brought in any court of this state, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 32(a).
(b) Pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken
from a judgment of a district court or before the taking
of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the
district court in which the judgment was rendered may
allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses to
perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of
further proceedings in such court. In such case the
party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may
make a motion in the district court for leave to take the
depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof
as if the action was pending in the district court. The
motion shall show (1) the names and addresses of
persons to be examined and the substance of the
testimony which expected to be elicited from each; and
(2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the
court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is
proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may
make an order allowing the depositions to be taken and
may make orders of the character provided for by
Rules 34 and 35, and thereupon the depositions may be
taken and used in the same manner and under the
same conditions as are prescribed in these rules for
depositions taken in actions pending in the district
court.
(c) Perpetuation by action. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony.
R u l e 28. P e r s o n s b e f o r e w h o m d e p o s i t i o n s m a y
be taken.
(a) Within the United States. Within the United
States or within a territory or insular possession
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, depositions shall be taken before an officer authorized to
administer oaths by the laws of the United States or of
the place where the examination is held, or before a
person appointed by the court in which the action is
pending. A person so appointed has power to administer oaths and take testimony. The term "officer* as used
in Rules 3 0 , 3 1 , and 32 includes a person appointed by
the court or designated by the parties under Rule 29.
(b) In foreign countries. In a foreign country, depositions may be taken (1) on notice before a person
authorized to administer oaths in the place in which
the examination is held, either by the law thereof or by
the law of the United States, or (2) before a person
commissioned by the court, and a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and take testimony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A
commission or a letter rogatory shall be issued on
application and notice and on terms that are just and
appropriate. It is not requisite to the issuance of a
commission or a letter rogatory that the taking of the
deposition in any other manner is impracticable or
inconvenient; and both a commission and a letter
rogatory may be issued in proper cases. A notice or
commission may designate the person before whom the
deposition is to be taken either by name or descriptive
title. A letter rogatory may be addressed "Tb the
Appropriate Authority in [here name of country].*
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Rule 37

unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall
not be required to serve answers or objections before
the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons
and complaint upon him. If objection is made, the
reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall
specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the
reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully
admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the
substance of the requested admission, and when good
faith requires t h a t a party qualify his answer or deny
only a p a r t of the matter of which an admission is
requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party
may not give lack of information or knowledge a s a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states
t h a t he h a s made reasonable inquiry and t h a t the
information known or readily obtainable by him is
insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who
considers t h a t a matter of which an admission h a s
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may
not, on t h a t ground alone, object to the request; he
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the
matter or set forth reasons why h e cannot admit or
deny it.

compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The
motion m u s t include a certification t h a t the movant
h a s in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with
the party not making the disclosure in an effort to
secure t h e disclosure without court action.
(aX2XB) If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 3 1 , or a
corporation or other entity fails to m a k e a designation
under Rule 30(bX6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party,
in response to a request for inspection submitted under
Rule 34, fails to respond t h a t inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order
compelling inspection in accordance with the request.
The motion m u s t include a certification t h a t the mova n t h a s in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with t h e person or party failing to m a k e t h e discovery
in an effort to secure t h e information or material
without court action. When taking a deposition on oral
examination, the proponent of t h e question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for
an order.

(aX3) The party who h a s requested the admissions
may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers
or objections. Unless the court determines t h a t an
objection is justified, it shall order t h a t an answer be
served. If the court determines t h a t an answer does not
comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order
either that the matter is admitted or t h a t an amended
answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these
orders, determine t h a t final disposition of the request
be made at a pretrial conference or a t a designated
time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply
to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any m a t t e r admitted under
this rule is conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or aweiiuuieiit of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing
amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit
withdrawal or amendment when t h e presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
t h e party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy
the court t h a t withdrawal or amendment will prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense on t h e merits.
Any admission made by a party under this rule is for
the purpose of the pending action only and is not an
admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be
used against him in any other proceeding.

(aX3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or
response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or
incomplete disclosure, answer, DT response is to be
treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(aX4) Expenses and sanctions.
(aX4XA) If t h e motion is granted, or if t h e disclosure
or requested discovery is provided after t h e motion was
filed, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to t h e moving party t h e
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining t h e order,
including attorney fees, unless the court finds t h a t the
motion was filed without the movant's first making a
good faith effort to obtain t h e disclosure or discovery
without court action, or t h a t the opposing party's
nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially
justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
(aX4XB) If the motion is denied, t h e court may enter
any protective order authorized u n d e r Rule 26(c) and
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving
party or the attorney advising t h e motion or both of
them to pay to t h e party or deponent who opposed t h e
motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing
t h e motion, including attorney fees, unless the court
finds t h a t t h e making of t h e motion was substantially
justified or t h a t other circumstances m a k e an award of
expenses unjust.
(aX4XC) Lf the motion is granted in p a r t and denied
in part, t h e court may enter any protective order
authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses
incurred in relation to t h e motion among the parties
and persons in a j u s t manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(bXD Sanctions by court in district where deposition
is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a
question after being directed to do so by t h e court in
t h e district in which t h e deposition is being taken, t h e
failure m a y be considered a contempt of t h a t court.
(bX2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending.
If a party fails to obey a n order entered under Rule
16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule

R u l e 37. Failure t o m a k e o r c o o p e r a t e i n discovery; s a n c t i o n s .
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery^ A party,
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling
discovery as follows:
(aXD Appropriate court An application for an order
to a party may be made to the court in which t h e action
is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to
the court in the district where t h e deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is
not a party shall be made to t h e court in the district
where the deposition is being taken.
(aX2) Motion.
(aX2XA) If a party fails to m a k e a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to
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30(bX6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including
an order m a d e u n d e r Subdivision (a) of this rule or
Rule 35, unless t h e court finds t h a t the failure was
substantially justified, t h e court in which the action is
pending may take such action in regard to t h e failure
as are j u s t , including the following:
(bX2XA) deem the m a t t e r or any other designated
facts to be established for t h e purposes of the action in
accordance with t h e claim of t h e party obtaining the
order;
(bX2XB) prohibit t h e disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or
from introducing designated m a t t e r s in evidence;
(bX2XC) strike pleadings or p a r t s thereof, stay further proceedings until t h e order is obeyed, dismiss the
action or proceeding or any p a r t thereof, or render
judgment by default against t h e disobedient party;
(bX2XD) order t h e party or the attorney to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused
by the failure;
(bX2XE) t r e a t the failure to obey an order, other
t h a n an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination, as contempt of court; and
(bX2XF) instruct the j u r y regarding an adverse inference.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to
admit the genuineness of any document or the t r u t h of
any m a t t e r as requested under Rule 36, and if t h e
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the
genuineness of the document or the t r u t h of the matter, the party requesting t h e admissions may apply to
the court for an order requiring t h e other party to pay
the reasonable expenses incurred in making t h a t proof,
including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall
make t h e order unless it finds t h a t (1) t h e request was
field objectionable p u r s u a n t to Rule 36(a), or (2) t h e
admission sought was of no substantia] importance, or
[3) t h e party failing to admit had reasonable ground to
believe t h a l h e might prevail on t h e matter, or (4) there
•vas other good reason for t h e failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or
ierve answers to interrogatories or respond to request
or inspection. If a party or a n officer, director, or
nanaging agent of a party or a person designated
inder Rule 3(XbX6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a
>arty fails (1) to appear before t h e officer who is to take
he deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
>r (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories
ubmitted u n d e r Rule 3 3 , after proper service of the
aterrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a
equest for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after
roper service of the request, the court on motion may
ake any action authorized by Subdivision (bX2).
The failure to act described in this subdivision may
ot be excused on the ground that the discovery sought
i objectionable unless the party failing to act has
pplied for a protective order a s provided by Rule 26(c),
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovy plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in
ood faith in the framing of a discovery plan by
greement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on
totion may take any action authorized by Subdivision
>X2).
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a
itness, document or other material as required by
ale 26(a) or Rules 26(eXD, or to amend a prior
sponse to discovery a s required by Rule 26(eX2), that
irty shall not be permitted to use t h e witness, docu-
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m e n t or other material a t any hearing unless the
failure to disclose is harmless or t h e party shows good
cause for t h e failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu
of this sanction, the court on motion may take any
action authorized by Subdivision (bX2).
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule
limits the inherent power of t h e court to take any
action authorized by Subdivision (bX2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, t a m p e r s with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or
other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.
PART VI. TRIALS
R u l e 38. J u r y trial o f r i g h t .
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by j u r y as
declared by t h e constitution or as given by statute shall
be preserved to t h e parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury
of any issue triable of right by a jury by paying t h e
statutory j u r y fee and serving upon the other parties a
demand therefor in writing a t any time after t h e
commencement of t h e action and not later t h a n 10
days after t h e service of t h e last pleading directed to
such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a
pleading of t h e party.
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a
party may specify t h e issues which h e wishes so tried;
otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial
by jury for all the issues so triable. If he h a s demanded
trial by j u r y for only some of t h e issues, any other
party, within 10 days after service of t h e demand or
such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a
demand for trial by jury of any other or all of t h e issues
of f a c t i f f l h e action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as required by this rule and
to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver
by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made
as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the
consent of t h e parties.
R u l e 3 9 . Trial b y j u r y o r b y t h e court.
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded
as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated
upon t h e register of actions as a jury action. The trial
of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless
(aXD The parties or their attorneys of record, by
written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral
stipulation made in open court and entered in the
record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a
jury, or
(aX2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative
finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those
issues does not exist, or
(aX3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the
trial.
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by
jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court;
but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand
a jury in an action in which such a demand might have
been made of right, the court in its discretion upon
motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.
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DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATING TO DAMAGES NOT DISCLOSED IN
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORY RESPONSE AND IN EXPERT REPORT

MICHAEL R. MERZ, Chief Magistrate Judge.
*1 This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Any
Evidence Relating to Damages Allegedly Suffered by Plaintiffs that Was Not Disclosed
in Plaintiffs1 Damages Interrogatory Response and in the Corresponding Expert Report of
Gregory H. Toman and Request for Expedited Ruling (Doc. No. 132). Plaintiffs oppose
the Motion (Doc. No. 134).
Procedural History
This case was removed to this Court on March 12, 2003.— A Preliminary Pretrial
Conference Order was entered by Judge Rose on September 24, 2003, that contemplated
phased discovery with liability issues in Phase I and damages issues in Phase II and a trial
in June 2005 (Doc. No. 36; See also the parties Rule 26(f) Report, Doc. No. 31).
FN1. On March 31, 2006, it was officially reported to Congress as having been pending
longer than the presumptive three-year limit set by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.
Such cases require the highest priority for trial consistent with Speedy Trial settings of
criminal cases.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C), each party in federal litigation is required to disclose
without demand

a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary
material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is
based, including material bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
The parties agreed in their Rule 26(f) Report (Doc. No. 31) to make the Rule 26(a)(1)
disclosures on or before August 6, 2003. On that date, Plaintiffs served on Defendant the
following statement:
In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, an
accounting, and attorneys' fees. Counsel for the parties have agreed to postpone any
specific computation of any of these categories of damages pending the conclusion of
"Phase I" of the parties' discovery. Upon completion of Phase I of discovery, the
plaintiffs will automatically, and promptly, supplement this disclosure to provide the
necessary computation (and supporting documentation) for all categories of damages
remaining relevant at that time.
(Exhibit 1 to Doc. No. 132). Plaintiffs have never supplemented this disclosure.
On September 12, 2003, Defendant served on Plaintiffs the following interrogatory:
20. With respect to each item of damage that Plaintiffs claim in the First Amended
Complaint, state:
a. the nature of the damages (including but not limited to whether the alleged damage
relates to the handling fee, the storage fee, non-payment of weigher/grader, cost of
purchase of the Facilities, cost of repairs to the Facilities, and/or cost of demolition of the
Facilities);
b. the precise amount of each claim of damage;
c. describe in detail all facts on which you rely in making each claim of damage;
d. describe in detail the method by which you calculate each item of damage; and
e. identify and produce all documents which support, refer or relate in any way to your
responses to this interrogatory.
Plaintiffs responded
ANSWER:
The Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory because it is unrelated to Phase I of discovery in
this case. The Plaintiffs will respond to this interrogatory during Phase II of the discovery
proceedings.

*2 (Plaintiffs1 Responses to Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit 2 to Doc.
No. 132).
On April 21, 2005, Judge Rose entered an Amended Preliminary Pretrial Conference
Order which eliminated the phased discovery; set a discovery deadline of November 3,
2005; and continued the trial to its present date, May 22, 2006. After the schedule was
amended, Defendant sought an answer to its damages interrogatory. On July 22, 2005,
Plaintiffs provided the following answer to Interrogatory No. 20.
ANSWER:
See Plaintiffs' Financial Expert Witness Report, filed July 7, 2005, which contains
detailed responses to subparts (a)-(d) above.
Plaintiffs' financial expert specifically reserved the right to supplement his report based
upon additional documents or evidence that might become available.
In addition, CGB maintains documents that support and will affect Plaintiffs' calculation
of damages contained in the Financial Expert Witness Report. These documents,
specifically with respect to Topic No. 4, have recently been ordered by the Court to be
produced. See Decision and Order (Doc. # 101).
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response based upon any documents
produced as a result of the Court's recent Decision and Order (Doc. #101).
Defendant then deposed Plaintiffs' damages expert, Mr. Toman, just before November 1,
2005, discovery cut-off. He testified that he had no other opinions about damages beyond
those he had disclosed and he has never supplemented his testimony or expert report.
On April 26, 2006, after a dispute in settlement negotiations about how much Plaintiffs
could recover at trial, Plaintiffs served a supplemental answer to Interrogatory 20 as
follows:
ANSWER:
Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory to the extent that it calls for legal conclusions and
seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product
doctrine.
Plaintiffs further state that, at the time this interrogatory was initially answered, and at the
time initial disclosures were made pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1), the parties had agreed to
implement two phases of discovery-liability and then damages. Without waiving these
objections, and subject thereto, Plaintiffs respond as follows:
a. Damages with respect to remaining claims are as follows:

Count 1-breach of contract, failure to negotiate storage fees for second and third year in
good faith, non-payment of weigher/grader.
Count 3-breach of fiduciary duties arising from attempt to form partnership regarding
seed program and seed manual.
Count 4-fraud regarding CGB' s intent to work for mutual benefit and concealment of
fact that it had no intention of honoring partnership and intended to use seed program for
its own use.
Count 5-violation of Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Count 7-conversion of Martin Land Company funds
a. Precise amount of each damage claim:
Count 1-$350,000 for storage fees for both years plus $47,000 for weigher/grader for a
total of$397,000.
*3 Count 3-specific dollar amount unknown and to be determined by the jury as no
authority addresses measure of damages for breach of fiduciary duty during formation of
partnership; however, at the very least, R.C. 1775.20 provides the remedy of an
accounting.
Count 4-specific dollar amount unknown and to be determined by the jury; however,
compensatory damages include purchase price of Facilities, travel time and expenses.
Count 5-specific dollar amount to be determined at trial; while Plaintiffs' economic exert
Greg Toman's report states damages in the amount of$ 152,275, he specifically reserved
the right to supplement his opinion on the quantity and expressly based the figure on
assumptions and limited documentation; in addition, Sixth Circuit authority permits
David Martin to testify as to trade secret damages and the amount of damages will be
calculated based on a minimum of 500,000 bushels.
Count 7-$5,500
c. The facts supporting each claim are found in Greg Toman's expert report, deposition
testimony from this case and all documents produced in discovery.
d. The methods of damages calculations are described above and in Greg Toman's expert
report; with respect to damages on the trade secrets claim, the $4.75 market price per
bushel at relevant time less $3.85 total cost per bushel = 90 cents margin per bushel x
number of bushels (500,000 minimum).
e. All documents supporting each damage claim have been exchanged in discovery.

(Exhibit 6 to Doc. No. 132).
Analysis
Defendant seeks to exclude at trial any damage theory or evidence not disclosed by
Plaintiffs' damages expert, Greg Toman, in his report or deposition because it read
Plaintiffs' July, 2005, answer to Interrogatory 20 as saying that Toman would be the sole
source of damages testimony (Motion Doc. No. 132). Defendant relies on Fed.R.Civ.P.
37(c)(1) which provides:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by
Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule
26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a
hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.

Defendant notes that Plaintiffs never supplemented their Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure and
Toman never supplemented his expert report; the only supplementation on damages has
been the amended answer to Interrogatory 20 which came less than a month before trial
when the parties disagreed in settlement negotiations about Plaintiffs' potential recovery.
Defendant argues the amended answer is not timely supplementation because it
introduces new theories, new amounts, and at least one new damages witness, Plaintiff
David Martin, and Defendant has had no opportunity for discovery on this amended
answer. Therefore, Defendant argues, the late supplementation is not justified and
certainly not harmless, since discovery has closed.
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion in Limine because they claim: "(A) CGB has not
demonstrated the Plaintiffs' response did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) or
alternatively supplementation was justified; (B) CGB was not prejudiced by the
supplementation; and (C) CGB's own actions mandate denial of the Motion in Limine."
(Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 2.)
*4 Plaintiffs assert first that Defendant misinterprets their Answer to Interrogatory No.
20 to say they would rely solely on Mr. Toman to testify on damages (Doc. No. 134 at 6),
but the Court finds that to be a completely reasonable interpretation of the original
Answer. While it indicates Mr. Toman may supplement his report, he has never done so.
While it indicates Plaintiff may discover new documents as a result of the Court's order
compelling Defendant to produce and may supplement based on those documents,
Plaintiffs never supplemented on their own initiative as Rule 26(e) requires and have
sought to add far more than numbers derived from late-produced documents.

1. Duty to Supplement

Plaintiffs next argue that, before it can justify sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1),
Defendant must show that "the 'new' damages information fell within the ambit of Rule
26(a) and, in fact, cannot do so ... because the Plaintiffs informed CGB of their intention
to put on evidence regarding the costs of the subject Facilities over three years ago." Id.
at 9. Plaintiffs claim Defendant acknowledges this fact in footnote 4 of the Motion in
Limine. In fact that footnote reads
Plaintiffs' claim for damages concerning the purchase price of the Facilities is outrageous.
Indeed, on May 31, 2005, CGB previously moved for summary judgment with respect to
this exact damages claim. See CGB's Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Document 79-1, pp. 17-19. On June 21, 2005, Plaintiffs responded that such issue was
not ripe for this Court's decision. See Pltfs' Opposition to Second Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Document 90-1, pp. 38-39. Now, Plaintiffs appear to be making a
claim for such damages.
(Doc. No. 132 at 5.) In fact, the footnote is not an acknowledgment that Plaintiffs have
ever answered Interrogatory No. 20 as to damages for the purchase price of the Facilities.
Instead, it is an expression of outrage that, despite having made such a claim during the
pendency of the suit, Plaintiffs have not produced an answer to Interrogatory No. 20 with
respect to such damages. For example, what is the claimed amount of such damages?
Even the April 26, 2006, answer says the amount is as yet undetermined.
With respect to damages for misappropriation of trade secrets, Plaintiffs assert that
under Ohio law the damages to be awarded for the improper use of a trade secret are
often determined by a jury, not by a mathematical calculation established by an expert.
Lay witness testimony is unquestionably appropriate for this purpose.
(Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 6.) Plaintiffs assert that trade secret
damages "simply do not fall within the ambit of Rule 26(a)." They purport to quote the
Advisory Committee to this effect:
As explained in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26, the
supplementation "... obligation applies only with respect to documents then reasonably
available.... Likewise, a party would not be expected to provide a calculation of damages
which, as in may [sic] patent infringement actions, depends on information in the
possession of another party or person."
*5 (Doc. No. 134 at 9-10). This is a serious misquotation; quoted language appears in the
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C) which
prescribes the initial disclosure requirement, not in the Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e), the
supplementation requirement.
In asserting they had no duty to supplement, Plaintiffs rely on Johnson v. H.K.
Webster, Inc., 775 F.2d L 3Fed. R. Serv.3d 20 (1st Cir.1985). However, the First Circuit
in that case was interpreting the pre-1993 version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) which provided

Supplementation of Responses: A party who has responded to a request for discovery
with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his
response to include information thereafter acquired, except as follows:...
The 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 very substantially changed the obligation to
supplement. The First Circuit itself recognized this in Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255
(1st Cir. 1998) holding expressly with respect to Johnson v. Webster that "pre-1993 cases
analyzing the sanction issue under the pre-amendment rubric retain only limited authority
in this post-amendment era." Id. at 269, n. 5. Klonoski is not cited by Plaintiffs, but was
readily revealed when the Court shepardized Johnson.
Based on their analysis of Rule 26, Plaintiffs assert they were not required to
supplement the prior answer to Interrogatory 20 at all, but that it was "provided solely as
a gratuitous accommodation to CGB, as it is the jury that will make this ultimate
determination at trial anyway. See, Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enterprise Co.
and P. Y.. 45 Fed.Appx. 479, 60 Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 353, (C.A.6, 2002)." The fact that a
jury will decide a question does not excuse a party from telling its opponent what
testimony it will place before the jury to make that determination. Avery Dennison does
not purport in any way to speak to the duties of a party in discovery.
Plaintiffs were under a duty, imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) to timely supplement both
their Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures and their answer to Interrogatory 20; their argument that
they had no such duty in unpersuasive.

2. Justification for Late Supplementation:
Plaintiffs then argue "Mr. Martin's testimony about the Plaintiffs' damages with regard
to CGB's unauthorized use of the Seed Manual is solely based upon projections and
documents provided by and in the possession of CGB." Id. at 10. They note that the
500,000 bushel projection which will form the basis of Mr. Martin's projected testimony
is taken directly from Consolidated's documents produced in discovery. Id.
Plaintiffs claim their late supplementation is justified by Defendant's failure to request
supplementation until the time when it was produced. (Memorandum in Opposition, Doc.
No. 134, at 11). Plaintiffs also argue that their failure to supplement is justified by
Consolidated's having moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' trade secret claim. Id.
They argue "[i]f CGB had provided the Plaintiffs with information regarding Precision
Soya, which it was required to do, then the Plaintiffs would have known earlier that trade
secret damages would be relevant for trial." Id. However, the duty to supplement under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) is not triggered by an opposing party's request or suspended by an
opponent's summary judgment motion. Instead, "[t]he obligation to supplement
disclosures and discovery responses applies whenever a party learns that its prior
disclosures or responses are in some material respect incomplete or incorrect." Advisory
Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment to Rule 26(e).

*6 Assuming Plaintiffs learned very late in the discovery period about the Precision
Soya-Consolidated 500,000 bushel projection,— they were without justification in
waiting six months to amend the answer.
FN2. The Court here merely uses Plaintiffs' characterization of this information, as the
Court has not seen this material.
3. Late Supplementation is Harmless
Next Plaintiffs assert that their late disclosure is harmless because Count 5 for
misappropriation of trade secrets was pled from the very beginning of the case and "the
nature of damages available for a violation of Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act call for a
determination by a jury and simply do not lend themselves to the absolute, mathematical
calculation demanded by CGB." (Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 12.)
This argument misses the point entirely. The fact that a jury will make the
determination of damages in no way implies that an opposing party is not entitled to
discovery the testimony on which the jury will make that determination. The authority
cited by Plaintiffs does indeed hold that "plaintiffs have used a number of different
methods of calculation to determine damages." Mid-Michigan Computer Systems. Inc. v.
Glassman, 416 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four
Pillars Enterprise Co., 45 Fed. Appx. 479, 485 (6th Cir.2002). But this authority supports
Defendant's position on the instant Motion rather than Plaintiffs': if there are a number of
different methods a plaintiff might choose among for proving damages, a defendant is
entitled to know which method this particular plaintiff is choosing in this case, and to
know it in time to prepare a defense.
Apparently Plaintiffs now expect to use a "reasonable royalty" approach to damages,
which is one of the measures of damages contemplated by Ohio Revised Code § 1333.63
and Mid-Michigan, supra. They state:
Mr. Martin certainly has the right to testify as to his belief about what a reasonable
royalty should be [but] his testimony is not dispositive. In sum then, CGB cannot be
harmed or prejudiced by the April supplementation because it is the jury's calculation of
royalty damages that is important, not Mr. Martin's.
(Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 13.) But even the April 26, 2006,
supplementation does not say Plaintiffs are using a reasonable royalty method, what Mr.
Martin believes the reasonable royalty rate is, how he reached that conclusion, and why
the rate he will testify to is reasonable. The fact that the Sixth Circuit has approved the
reasonable royalty method says nothing about Mr. Martin's competence to testify what a
reasonably royalty rate is or that he can take the stand to state his "belief without having
disclosed the basis for it prior to trial.

4. Competing Discovery Misconduct

In the last section of their Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiffs ask the Court to
weigh any violation of Rule 26(e) which they are found to have committed against
Consolidated's discovery violations. They assert "CGB's failure to forward the Precision
Soya documentation, standing alone, more than offsets any harm CGB might experience
due to the late supplementation...." (Id. at 16), leading to the conclusion Plaintiffs should
not be sanctioned at all. In suggesting this would be appropriate, Plaintiffs rely entirely
on case authority from before the 1993 Amendment to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
*7 A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by
Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule
26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a
hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed
In interpreting this Rule, the Sixth Circuit has held:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) requires absolute compliance with Rule 26(a),
that is, it "mandates that a trial court punish a party for discovery violations in connection
with Rule 26 unless the violation was harmless or is substantially justified." Vance v.
United States, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 14943, 1999 WL 455435, at *3 (1999) (footnote
omitted); see also Salzado v. General Motors Corp.. 150 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir.1998)
(noting that "the sanction of exclusion is automatic and mandatory unless the sanctioned
party can show that its violation of Rule 26(a) was either justified or harmless"). We
agree with the circuits that have put the burden on the potentially sanctioned party to
prove harmlessness. See Salgado, 150 F.3d at 741-42: Wilson v. Bradlees of New
England. Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir.2001); Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d
1038, 1040 (5th Cir.1999). The decision not to impose sanctions is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. See King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 900 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 531
U.S. 960, 121 S.Ct. 386, 148 L.Ed.2d 298 (2000).
Roberts v. Galen ofVa., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir.2003). Plaintiffs have not
proved that their failure to comply at an appropriate time with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) was
either harmless or substantially justified.
The Court expressly rejects Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant's resistance to
discovery justifies their late response. The proper method of dealing with discovery
violations is to file a motion to compel. When Plaintiffs did so, they received this Court's
assistance (See Decision and Order, Doc. No. 101).
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Relating to
Damages Allegedly Suffered by Plaintiffs that Was Not Disclosed in Plaintiffs' Damages
Interrogatory Response and in the Corresponding Expert Report of Gregory H. Toman is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs' damages testimony at trial is limited to that disclosed by Gregory
H. Toman in his expert report and deposition. If Mr. Toman states in his expert report

that the amount of damages from imposing a reasonable royalty rate is dependent on the
number of bushels Consolidated would have sold and Plaintiffs can show the number of
bushel projection they rely on was made by Consolidated in documents which
Consolidated should have produced earlier but did not produce until the end of discovery
or which Plaintiffs had to obtain from Precision Soya, then Mr. Toman may base his
testimony on that figure.
S.D.Ohio,2006.
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